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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF TRANSFER

In the United States, some form of waiver of juvenile jurisdiction, or
transfer of youth to criminal jurisdiction, has been available in most states
since the inception of their juvenile courts around the turn of the last
century.'
From the beginning, transfer to criminal court was regarded as
necessary to remove serious and violent offenders who were thought to be
too dangerous or too intractable for the juvenile justice system.2 Transfer

* Lonn Lanza-Kaduce, Professor of Criminology and Sociology, the University of

Florida; Charles E. Frazier, Professor of Sociology and Affiliate Professor in the Center for
Studies in Criminology and Law, the University of Florida; Donna M. Bishop, Associate
Professor of Criminal Justice and Legal Studies, the University of Central Florida.
1. See BARBARA FLICKER, CURRENT POLICY ISSUES: TRANSFERRING JUVENILES TO
ADULT COURT FOR TRIAL (1983); Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV.
104, 109 (1909).
2. See David S. Tanenhaus, The Evolution of Waiver in the Juvenile Court, in THE
CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO CRIMINAL COURT

(Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds., forthcoming 1999).
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was available for the most serious offenders, the "worst of the worst. 3
Transfer was rarely used and remained nonproblematic as long as the juvenile
justice system had a more or less shared notion of intractability and
dangerousness and as long as "it remained firmly grounded in a parens
patriae orientation." 4 Support for the parens patriae philosophy has since
eroded. Now, on the brink of a new century, transfer
has become a pivotal
6
issue, driving the most recent reform movement.
Between 1992 and 1995, forty-one states enacted provisions to facilitate
the trial of juveniles as adults in criminal court.7 This was pursued in three
basic ways: the expansion of judicial waiver, for example, as through
presumptive judicial waiver statutes; the legislative exclusion of cases either
by lowering the maximum age of juvenile justice jurisdiction from seventeen
to fifteen or sixteen or by excluding some offenses, for example, murder,
from juvenile court jurisdiction; and the authorization of prosecutors to file
charges directly in criminal court.8
The impact of the recent expansion of judicial waiver has been mixed.
The number of cases judicially waived increased 73% from 6800 cases in
1987 to 11,700 cases in 1994.9 The number then decreased in 1995 to about
9700 cases before rebounding somewhat to 10,000 cases in 1996.10 When
the number of judicially waived cases was examined as a percentage of all
juvenile cases, the percentage remained low throughout the period (less than
1.5%)." Judicial waiver, however, represents just the tip of the iceberg.
Legislative exclusion and prosecutorial direct file have a far greater

3. Id. We do not intend to define what is meant by the "worst of the worst." Rather
we are content with examining some dimensions of seriousness that have relevance for transfer
decisions, including the initial charges, the circumstances surrounding the offense, prior
records, case processing events, and background information. We believe the data raise
questions about whether transfer in Florida is reserved for the most serious offenders.
4. Donna M. Bishop et al., Juvenile Justice UnderAttack: An Analysis of the Causes and
Impact of Recent Reforms, 10 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 129, 131 (1998).
5. See id.; Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principleof Offense: Legislative
Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471, 472 (1987)
[hereinafter Feld, Legislative Changes];Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle
of the Offense: Punishment, Treatment, and the Difference It Makes, 68 BOSTON L. REV. 821,
852 (1988).
6. See PATRICIA TORBET ET AL., STATE RESPONSES TO SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE

CRIME 3 (1996).
7.

MELISSA SICKMUND ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OJJDP, JUVENILE OFFENDERS

AND VICTIMS: 1997 UPDATE ON VIOLENCE 30 (1997).

8. See id.; TORBET ET AL., supra note 6, at 4.
9. See ANNE L. STAHL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OJJDP FACT SHEET, DELINQUENCY
CASES WAIVED TO CRIMINAL COURT, 1987-1996, Apr. 1999, at 1.
10. See id. These statistics focus only on judicial waivers and do not include estimates
of cases that were either legislatively excluded from juvenile jurisdiction or directly filed in
criminal court. See id.
11. See id.
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potential to affect the processing of juvenile offenders. Over a span of only
a few years, legislatures in thirty-two states modified their statutes to lower
the age limit of juvenile justice jurisdiction, or increase the range of offenses
excluded from juvenile jurisdiction, or both.' 2 Estimates for 1991 indicated
that 176,000 youths were brought into criminal court by lower age jurisdictions.'"
The potential impact of expanding the direct file authority of prosecutors
has been documented most clearly in Florida. 4 In 1980, less than 3% of
the nearly 43,000 delinquency filings in Florida were transferred to criminal
court and only about half of the transfers had charges filed directly by the
prosecutor. 5 By 1987, over 7% of the more than 57,000 delinquency
filings resulted in transfer and over 88% of the charges were filed directly by
the prosecutor. 16 In 1993, almost 9% of the nearly 75,000 delinquency
filings resulted in transfer to criminal court, and 93% of the cases were
directly filed by the prosecutors. 7 From July 1994 through June 1995, over
5000 youths, involved in more than 7000 cases, were transferred to criminal
court, over 90% of the time by direct files.' 8
Prosecuting juveniles as adults in criminal court is no longer an unusual
occurrence, especially where age jurisdictions have been lowered, where
offenses have been legislatively excluded from juvenile jurisdiction, and
where direct file has become available.' 9 Although some maintain that
transfer ought to be reserved for exceptional cases in the juvenile system (and
in this sense even liken transfer to capital punishment in the adult system), 2°

12. See TORBET ET AL., supra note 6, at 4.
13. See HOwARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE
OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: A NATIONAL REPORT 88 (1995).
14. See JUVENILE JUSTICE ADVISORY BOARD, 1996 ANNUAL REPORT AND JUVENILE
JUSTICE FACT BOOK 64-65 (1996) [hereinafter 1996 ANNUAL REPORT]; JUVENILE JUSTICE
ADVISORY BOARD, 1994 ANNUAL REPORT AND JUVENILE JUSTICE FACT BOOK 122 (1994);
Donna M. Bishop & Charles E. Frazier, Transfer of Juveniles to Criminal Court: A Case
Study and Analysis of ProsecutorialWaiver, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 281,
286 (1991); Donna M. Bishop et al., Prosecutorial Waiver: Case Study of a Questionable
Reform, 35 CRIME & DELINQ. 179, 182 (1989); Lonn Lanza-Kaduce et al., Changes in
Juvenile Waiver and Transfer Provisions: Projecting the Impact in Florida, 18 L. & POL'Y
137, 138 (1996); Charles E. Frazier, Deep End Juvenile Justice Placements or Transfer to
Adult Court by Direct File: A Report to the Florida Commission on Juvenile Justice 1 (1991)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
15. See Bishop et al., supra note 14, at 183.
16. See id.
17. See 1996 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 14, at 66.
18. See Donna M. Bishop et al., Juvenile Transfers to Criminal Court Study: Phase I, at
1 (1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author). This amounted to 10% of juvenile
offenders who were handled judicially in the state. See id.
19. See Franklin E. Zimring, The Treatment of Hard Cases in American Juvenile Justice,
5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 267, 272-75 (1991).
20. See id. at 279.
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the evidence indicates that the practice is becoming common and perhaps
even routine. 21 Thus, transfer warrants close study.
Transfer raises questions about fairness and effectiveness that deserve
careful scrutiny. "[W]aiver reforms assume that the transfer of juveniles to
criminal court can work to make the administration of justice more fair, and
'
more effective in controlling and preventing serious juvenile crime. 22
However, the reforms might be a reflection of "the personal and institutional
goals of politicians and other opinion leaders ... [more] than a rational
reaction to any real crisis. 23
Two basic questions concerning fairness are how "bad" are transferred
youth and are they sufficiently "bad" to require their removal from the
juvenile justice system? To answer these questions, information needs to be
collected that describes transfers accurately, but neither question can be
answered in the absolute. Even if transferred youth were "bad" (as measured
by some agreed upon objective criteria), they might not be "worse" than
many who are retained in the juvenile system. Thus, the two questions
should be combined and recast: Are transferred youths the worst of the
worst?
Some research suggests that not all transferred youths are the most
serious offenders, even if seriousness is defined broadly. In Howell's recent
review of thirty-six studies of judicial waiver, for example, at least ten
percent of the cases across the various jurisdictions did not involve either
violent offenders or serious property offenders.24 In Florida, where direct
filing is the primary method of transfer,25 the percentage of cases transferred
for misdemeanor offenses remains over fifteen percent, although it has
declined since the last decade.26 The empirical record, at least at first
glance, casts some doubt on the conclusion that transfer is reserved for the
worst of the worst.
Doubts also can be raised about the effectiveness of transferring youth
to criminal court relative to retaining them in the juvenile system. Although
recidivism is not the only measure of outcome effectiveness, 27 it remains a
critically important policy consideration. Policymakers need and want to

21. See SICKMUND ET AL., supra note 7, at 29-30.
22. Simon I. Singer, Merging and Emerging Systems of Juvenile and Criminal Justice, 18
L. & POL'Y 1, 11 (1996).
23. G. Larry Mays & Peter R. Gregware, The Children's Code Reform Movement in New
Mexico: The Politics of Expediency, 18 L. & POL'Y 179, 179 (1996).
24. See James C. Howell, Juvenile Transfers to the CriminalJustice System: State of the
Art, 18 L. & POL'Y 17, 21 (1996).
25. See Bishop et al., supra note 14, at 183 (stating that in 1987, nearly 90% of transfer
were made through direct file).
26. See Bishop et al., supra note 18, at 51.
27. See Singer, supra note 22, at 9-11.
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know whether retention in the juvenile court or transfer to criminal court is
more effective in preventing recidivism. To date, the only studies directly
28
on point suggest that transfer may actually aggravate recidivism.
These studies have received a great deal of attention as states and the
federal government struggle with ways to deal with serious and violent
juvenile offenders. 29 The scrutiny has highlighted the need to address
fundamental philosophical and research questions. Primary among them are
questions about whether transfer effectively screens out the worst cases from
the juvenile justice system and how to gather the information needed to make
that determination. Earlier research has depended mainly on automated data
sets30 and small samples of cases collected over several years, which make
the results vulnerable to historical events.3'
The purpose of this article is to examine what is needed to assess the
issues of fairness and effectiveness, which are central to the rationales
underpinning transfer policies. We start by considering the adequacy of the
data that are most often used to learn about transfer. We then report the
findings from an in-depth study of local records. This field research
illustrates how complex information gathering is on matters relevant to
transfer. We then use the more detailed processing information gained from
our study of local records to profile transfer cases and to assess the
comparability between criminal court transfers and their juvenile matches,
who were selected on the basis of statewide automated data. The
implications of the results for studying the fairness and effectiveness of
transfer are then discussed.

28. See Jeffrey Fagan, Separating the Men from the Boys: The Comparative Advantage
of Juvenile Versus Criminal Court Sanctions on Recidivism Among Adolescent Felony

Offenders, in A SOURCEBOOK: SERIOUS, VIOLENT, AND CHRONIC JUVENILE OFFENDERS 238,
252 (James C. Howell et al. eds., 1995); Donna M. Bishop et al., The Transfer of Juveniles
to CriminalCourt: Does It Make a Difference?, 42 CRIME & DELINQ. 171, 183 (1996); Jeffrey

Fagan, The Comparative Advantage of Juvenile Versus Criminal Court Sanctions on
Recidivism Among Adolescent Felony Offenders, 18 L. & POL'Y 77, 98 (1996) [hereinafter
Fagan, The Comparative Advantage]; Lawrence Winner et al., The Transfer of Juveniles to
CriminalCourt: Reexamining Recidivism over the Long Term, 43 CRIME & DELINQ. 548, 557

(1997).
29. For example, the State of Florida conducted a study to compare the effectiveness of
the juvenile and criminal justice systems regarding violent, serious, and chronic offenders.
See 1996 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 14, at 31-32.
30. See Bishop & Frazier, supra note 14, at 286; Bishop et al., supra note 14, at 182;
Bishop et al., supra note 28, at 176; Winner et al., supra note 28, at 549.
31. See Dean J. Champion, Teenage Felons and Waiver Hearings:Some Recent Trends
1980-1988, 35 CRIME & DELINQ. 577, 580 (1989); Francis Barry McCarthy, The Serious
Offender and Juvenile Court Reform: The Case for ProsecutorialWaiver of Juvenile Court
Jurisdiction,38 ST. Louis U. L.J. 629, 635 (1994).
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SOURCES OF TRANSFER DATA

Although issues of fairness and effectiveness in juvenile transfer cases are
always important, the trend toward increased use of transfer raises the stakes
in the policy debate. Policymakers need to know whether transfer is reserved
for the worst of the worst and whether transfer is more effective than juvenile
intervention. However, the data to inform the debate are derived from
official records, including automated statewide information systems, which
depend on the accuracy of local input."
Problems with the validity and reliability of official juvenile data and the
implications these problems hold for decision-making have long been
recognized.33 Usually, researchers focus on the summary information
collected by government, for example, whether the person was formally
charged, the category of the most serious formal charge, whether the person
was adjudicated guilty, and the sentence given.34 This information is not
standardized from place to place.35
The summary official data that are most readily available provide more
information about outcomes than they do on the processes that produced
those outcomes.36 This gap in knowledge about legal processing might, at
once, hamper both an understanding of transfer as law in practice and the
ability to assess issues of fairness and effectiveness.
Legal processing can affect the accuracy of evaluations of fairness and
effectiveness in several ways. First, decisions at various stages of processing,
even when reasonable and justifiable, might produce a distorted final picture
of the seriousness of the case in that they are recorded as successive
summaries of the outcomes along the way. Such outcome summaries are
often forced into categories, for example, transferred versus retained, detained
versus released.37 The case and the profile of the offender involved in it
become simplified, and information is lost. The input used to make each of
the series of decisions as the case moves through the system usually is not

32. See MELISSA SICKMUND ET AL., DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OJJDP, JUVENILE COURT

STATISTICS 1995, at 2 (1998).
33. See Maynard L. Erickson & Lamar T. Empey, Court Records, Undetected
Delinquency and Decision-Making, 54 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 456, 456

(1963).
34. See SICKMUND ET AL., supra note 32, at 2.
35. For example, the 1998 nationwide analysis of judicial waiver relied on the secondary
analysis of data originally compiled by juvenile courts or juvenile justice agencies to meet
their own information and reporting needs. See id. That analysis was hampered because data
files were not standardized across jurisdictions. See id.
36. See id. (briefly describing a generic model of court processing).
37. See Erickson & Empey, supra note 33, at 463-66 (discussing the usefulness of various
traditional dichotomies).
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captured in automated statewide data. For example, the summary might
indicate that an individual was detained and subsequently adjudicated
delinquent on a battery but might not contain information about the
circumstances, such as victim injury, which might influence decisions and
help assess the seriousness of the case or the offender. The final characterizations beg the questions of how "bad" the offenders are or whether they
are the worst of the worst. The oversimplifications undercut the ability to
make valid comparisons across individuals or cases, or between groups of
transferred youth and groups of juveniles retained in the juvenile system.
Without valid comparisons, neither the fairness nor the effectiveness issues
can be assessed.
Second, prior legal processing decisions can affect what data are
collected or maintained, which in turn, affect subsequent decision-making.
Consider, for example, how a prior offense history is built and maintained,
a variable that is often officially identified as a consideration in transfer
decisions."8 A juvenile who is diverted benefits from a different prior
record, with different information collected and maintained, than a juvenile
who is processed through the juvenile system, even though their original
offenses might have been similar. Different types of data might be available
to characterize individuals or cases, making it difficult to use summary
outcome information to assess either the fairness or effectiveness of juvenile
transfer.
Third, researchers and policymakers who rely on summary outcome data,
especially data obtained from statewide automated information systems,
tacitly assume that processing decisions are made in a cohesive and unified
justice system.39 This simplifying assumption is problematic for two
reasons. First, the degree of coupling between the juvenile and adult justice
systems is contested as a matter of both principle and practice. 40 To the
extent that the juvenile system is distinct, its processes, the data it gathers,
and the outcomes it produces are less comparable with those of the adult
system.4 ' This dissimilarity between the systems complicates the assessment of whether transfers are the worst of the worst and of the relative effectiveness of juvenile versus adult court processing.
Second, singularity in either the juvenile system or the adult system

38. For example, see the waiver criteria prompted by Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541,
566-67 (1966) (Appendix to Opinion of the Court), which the State of Florida codified in its
presumptive judicial waiver provision, FLA. STAT. § 985.226(3)(c)(1997).
39. See SICKMUND ET AL., supra note 32, at 2-3. "The Archive restructures contributed
data into standardized coding categories in order to combine information from multiple
sources." Id.
40. See Singer, supra note 22, at 2.
41. See id.
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cannot be assumed. In reality, both are constituted by multiple subsystems.
Considerable variation in practices concerning juvenile offenders,
including practices that involve transfer, has been documented across locales
in the same state. 43 Local cultures and local practices affect decisionmaking. 44 Data that summarize outcomes do not take these differences into
account,45 making it more difficult to determine how "bad" cases are or how
effective different interventions are.
A major concern is that automated data banks might mask the seriousness
of most transfer cases and how complicated processing of a case is in
general. Analyses of Florida's automated statewide Client Information
Services (CIS) data from 1984' and from 199047 raised questions about
whether transfer was being reserved for the worst juvenile offenders. 48 How
these questions will be answered depends in part on the accuracy of the data.
If the seriousness of cases is being masked, the statewide automated CIS
data might produce invalid matches between transfer cases and cases retained
in the juvenile court - matches that were used in our prior recidivism
analyses.49 Inasmuch as the prior studies found higher recidivism for
transferred youth than for their matches retained in the juvenile justice
system, 50 the possibility that the automated data misses crucial information
has important research and policy implications regarding recidivism.
One aim of our ongoing research sponsored by the federal Office of
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention was to address this potential
weakness in the data on transfer. The automated state data might have
provided only partial and incomplete pictures of transferred youths, their
offenses, and offense histories. Too little was known about some potentially
crucial features of offenses that might have both influenced transfer decisionmaking and differentiated transferred youths from those retained in the

42. See Barry C. Feld, Justice by Geography: Urban, Suburban,and Rural Variations in
Juvenile Justice Administration, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 156, 156 (1991).
43. See id. at 156-67; Donna M. Bishop et al., A Study of Juvenile Case Processing in
Florida: Issues of Timeliness and Consistency Across Jurisdictions 1 (1996) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
44. See Feld, supra note 42, at 208.
45. See id.
46. See Bishop & Frazier, supra note 14, at 293.
47. See Frazier, supra note 14, at 1.
48. Analysis of transfer cases in 1993 using Florida's statewide automated Offender Based
Transaction System for the Office of the State Courts Administrator (OSCA) raised similar
questions. Charles E. Frazier et al., Juvenile Justice Transfer Legislation in Florida: Assessing
the Impact on the Criminal Justice and Correctional Systems 1 (1995) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author). According to the OSCA data, over 25% of the cases filed in
adult criminal court against persons under 18 years of age listed misdemeanors, infractions,
or ordinance violations as the most serious charge. See id. at 4-5.
49. See Bishop et al., supra note 28, at 175; Winner et al., supra note 28, 549-50.
50. See Bishop et al, supra note 28, at 183.
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juvenile system. Examples of missing data include extent of victim injury,
weapon use, whether the offender was under the influence of drugs or
alcohol, number and nature of codefendants, and the victim-offender
relationship.
Additionally, too little was known about the actual processing of transfer
cases. Critical issues that were not explored adequately included the
detention or release status of youths awaiting trial, attrition of cases as they
moved from juvenile division prosecutors to prosecutors in criminal divisions,
crimes committed by youths on pretrial release, the nature and extent of plea
negotiations in transfer cases, and the nature of dispositions/sentences for
transferred youth who were convicted. Details about offenders, offenses, and
processing that are needed to address issues of fairness and effectiveness are
contained primarily in case records maintained at the local level. Those local
records offer a potentially rich source of information that could be useful to
the policy debates about transfer.
I1. AN IN-DEPTH STUDY OF LOCAL RECORDS

A.

The Sample

Florida is divided into twenty judicial circuits, and case detail is compiled
in the records of the county clerks of court. Gleaning information from court
records is a slow and labor-intensive process. Without a master list of cases
identified by the statewide automated CIS system, searching all the local
criminal records to isolate the transfers is like finding a needle in a haystack.
Even with a master list, time and funding constraints precluded us from
reviewing cases from all Florida circuits. Jurisdictions were selected that
ranged from rural to urban because Feld had found that transfer practices
varied along this dimension.5' Jurisdictions were also chosen that had
different rates of transfer according to research of Florida's automated CIS
data for 1993.52
The four judicial circuits chosen for study were circuits 3, 5, 6, and 9,
which are located in north central and central Florida.53 Circuit 3, a very
rural circuit, had a moderate rate of transfer in 1993, according to the CIS
data (7.0% of cases referred to intake).54 Circuit 5, covering a largely rural
area, had the lowest rate of transfer in Florida in 1993, according to CIS data

51. See Feld, supra note 42, at 156.
52. See Bishop et al., supra note 43, at 23, 31.
53. The counties in the Third Circuit are Columbia, Dixie, Hamilton, Lafayette, Madison,
Suwanee, and Taylor. The counties in the Fifth Circuit are Citrus, Hernando, Lake, Marion,
and Sumter. The counties in the Sixth Circuit are Pasco and Pinellas. The counties in the
Ninth Circuit are Orange and Osceola.
54. See id. at 31.
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(2.6% of cases referred to intake)." Circuit 6, a mostly urban jurisdiction,
had the state's highest rate of transfer in 1993, according to the CIS data
(10.8% of cases referred to juvenile intake).56 Circuit 9, an urban area, had
a modest rate of transfer in 1993, according to CIS data (4.6% of cases
referred to intake)."
The statewide CIS data for 1995 were used to identify both transfer cases
and match cases retained in juvenile divisions in each of the four circuits.
We relied on the same matching procedure that we had used in our previous
short- and long-term recidivism analyses. This procedure matched cases on
the seriousness of the referral charge, the number of referral charges, the
number of prior charges according to CIS, the most serious prior offense,
age, gender, and race.58 We identified up to four matches for each transfer
case in the four circuits, rather than across the circuits or statewide, as we
had done in the original recidivism analyses. Within-circuit matches could
not be found in the CIS data for all transfer cases, especially in the smaller,
more rural circuits. The list of transfers and matches were then taken into
the county courthouses in each of the circuits. The files were pulled and data
were collected from both the computerized local records and the actual hardcopy case files.
B. Local Variation and the Lack of Uniformity:
Developing a Local Data Collection Instrument
The development of a data collection instrument for the in-depth circuit
court records proved to be a multistage process. Members of our research
staff first visited courthouses in Columbia and Marion counties to peruse
records of transferred youth. The various records included similar documents
and contained much of the detail absent from the automated state data. The
first draft of our data collection instrument focused on the documents that
were contained, more or less consistently, in the county clerk-of-court files,
for example, formal charging instruments, arrest or probable cause affidavits,
offense or incident reports, judgment documents, and sentencing orders. The
plan was to link the recorded data with the court documents from which they
were retrieved. Because official record "jackets" often contain some
inconsistent information from one document to another, the researchers
wanted to attach the source to each item of data. Reliance on specific
documents also would reduce the amount of interpretation that would be
required of field staff and in turn, improve the reliability of the in-depth data.

55. See id.
56. See id.

57. See id.
58. See Bishop et al., supra note 28, at 175; Winner et al., supra note 28, at 549-50.

1999]

JUVENILE TRANSFER IN FLORIDA

Because of the possibility of multiple charges, the document-based approach
resulted in a lengthy data collection instrument that collected recurring
information, for example, arrest charges, charges on the information or
indictment, and charges at time of judgement or adjudication.
After we had gained more experience with collecting data in additional
counties in Circuits 6 and 9, the document-based approach was modified, as
several problems became apparent. First, the clerk-of-court documents
proved to be too dissimilar from county to county. A specific detail
regularly found in a particular type of document in one jurisdiction might be
found in different paperwork in another jurisdiction. Thus, the researcher had
to leaf from page to page in the data collection instrument to locate and
record the information. This was time-consuming and increased the
likelihood of recording errors. The data collection instrument could not be
organized exclusively around particular documents.
Second, juvenile justice processing is both similar and dissimilar to
criminal court processing. A comparison of transfers and their juvenile
justice matches required a data collection instrument that was standardized
to collect information that was similar in both systems yet flexible enough
to capture that which was different. Arrest, formal charging, plea bargaining,
adjudication, and disposition follow parallel courses in the two systems, so
directly comparable data collection instruments can be used for much of the
information, such as offense charges, legal representation, victim matters,
restitution, and drug testing. Nevertheless, some adjustments in language and
recording options had to be made. For example, the range of adult
dispositions ran from locally operated probation and community-based
corrections to county jail confinement to state-administered probation,
community control, and prison. Since each of these dispositions were
structured differently, separate subsections were required on the data
collection instrument. Juvenile dispositions ranged from diversion programs
to "community control," which referred to probation in the juvenile system,
to various levels of nonresidential and residential treatment. Again separate
subsections had to be included. Some matters, like adult sentencing
guidelines, are distinctive of only one system, so alternate sections were
devised on the data collection instrument to reflect systemwide differences.
Third, even when the same type of information was found in different
documents, it could not necessarily be compared across documents. Some
case information changed over time, for example, charges were added or
dropped, bail was reconsidered, or lawyers were replaced, and therefore the
information could not be recorded as a single entry. However, these changes
were critical to understanding the dynamics of the case and the processing
decisions that were made. The data collection instrument had to capture the
sequence or flow of the cases so information could be recorded at multiple
points in the process. A short and compact format was not possible.
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The data collection instrument had to be organized around the customary
or typical flow or sequence of a case, be flexible enough to record information in parallel ways to reflect the similarities of the adult and juvenile
systems, contain separate subsections for information that was unique to one
of the respective justice systems, and be comprehensive enough to incorporate the dynamics and change that occurred during case processing. A new
data collection instrument was drafted and field tested. The sequence
approach worked better but also needed to be refined.
Some data, for example, complainant characteristics, victim characteristics, and victim loss or injury, were found on more than one document,
which were completed at various points in processing. Thus, we created a
section to collect this type of repeated information. Inasmuch as some cases
involved multiple charges and covered multiple events, complainant and
victim details were gathered for only the most serious charge, as determined
by the field researcher after reading the case file.
The field staff also quickly learned that the course of cases often did not
follow the anticipated progression as laid out in the data collection
instrument. Even though the court records generally were organized
chronologically, some cases as they proceeded became complicated. For
example, new charges were added or cases were consolidated sometimes for
prosecution or sometimes just for sentencing, new offenses were committed
during processing, or the current case triggered disposition on an old
outstanding case. Consequently, the data collection form had to be revised
to reflect how many separate or related "incidents" were involved in the
processing. A single incident involving a single charge might be processed
differently from a single incident involving multiple charges. Moreover, a
single incident whether involving one or multiple charges might be processed
differently from multiple incidents, which by definition yield multiple
charges.
The timing of incidents also proved to be important in understanding the
larger context of a case and how processing decisions were made. Multiple
incidents would often be handled differently if all of the incidents were
known at the outset rather than when additional incidents occurred or came
to light after processing had begun.
The data collection instrument had to reflect the complexity surrounding
single versus multiple charges, single versus multiple incidents, and the
prospect that charges in a case could be added, dropped, or reduced. In
addition, incidents could be severed from or consolidated with the triggering
case at various points in processing. Field staff soon learned that they had
to read the case file in its entirety to complete the data collection instrument
well. To get a handle on a case, the researchers wrote a narrative overview
that captured the nature of the triggering event, the flow of the resulting case,
and that case's relationship to other incidents before they entered specific
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information on the data collection instrument. This made it easier for the
field researcher to record the various items on the data collection instrument
and for research supervisors to review codings for accuracy. The extra time
taken resulted in more accurate data collection and fewer mistakes.
The dynamic nature of case processing dictated that information be
collected in such a way that the respective charges could be tracked. For
cases with multiple counts, charge data were entered in the order in which
they appeared on the formal charging document. That order was retained
throughout the rest of data collection so developments with each charge could
be traced. A separate subsection was included for charges that were
consolidated with the case after the initial formal charging.
The final data collection instrument was far more complex and lengthier
than the first. Several steps were taken to facilitate its use. For example, the
sections were color-coded so they could be found more easily. Field training
was crucial to researchers learning how to use the instrument. Decision rules
were made and shared as unanticipated situations arose in the field. "Trouble
cases" were reviewed by more than one researcher.
One of the goals of the research was to gather details not available from
the statewide data sources. The incremental development of the data
collection instrument and its complexity stood as stark reminders of how
simplified the automated data systems are. Consequently, we could not
dismiss the prospect that the summary outcome data previously used in much
of the policy-relevant research on transfer might have distorted cases.
C. Field Adjustments to Sampling:
Problems in the Automated Data
The data collected in the field immediately pointed to reliability and
validity problems with Florida's CIS data, especially as regards the sampling
method. The earliest transfer event for each individual in 1995 was
identified using CIS. These cases were separated from the cases of
individuals who were not transferred and who would be used in our screening
for matches. In each of the four circuits, a computer search of the CIS data
was made to locate those transfer cases for which perfect matches on all
seven criteria (offense, number of counts, prior referrals, most serious prior
referral, age, gender, and race) were available. Table 1 presents the results
of this search, including the percentage of transfers for which perfect matches
were located. We refer to this as the percentage of "hits" or the "hit" rate.
As data collection began in Circuits 6 and 9, it became clear that the
percentage of match "hits" using CIS data was not holding up in the field for
several reasons. Many of the cases coded in CIS as transfers (1) were not
located in the local court records, (2) were never really transferred, or (3) had
actually been transferred either prior to the date that triggered their inclusion
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in the study or for offenses that occurred after 1995 (our study period). The
sampling rate was adjusted accordingly. This adjustment yielded the target
number of cases in Circuits 6 and 9 but could not compensate for the
shortfall in cases from Circuits 3 and 5. The final counts of transfer cases
for each of the respective circuits and the reasons for case attrition are
summarized in Table 2.
Table 1
Transfer Cases in Four Circuits for Which
Perfect Juvenile Matches Were Located in CIS
Transfers with
Matches

Total
Transfer

Circuit

No.

No.

%

3

14

75

18.7

5

55

125

44.0

6

370

635

58.3

9

176

379

46.4

"Hits"

No. = number

Table 2
Transfer Cases for In-depth Data Collection and
Reasons for Attrition by Judicial Circuit

Circuit

CIS
Trans.*

Actual 1995
Trans.

Not
Found

Not
Trans.

Not 1995
Trans.

No.

No.

%

No.

%

No.

%

No

%

3

14

7

50

2

14

5

36

0

0

5

55

36

66

6

11

11

20

2

4

6

371

107

29

27

7

219

59

18

5

9

176

105

60

0

0

71

40

0

0

Total

616

255

41

35

6

306

50

20

3

* In Circuits 3, 5, and 6, the number of CIS transfers is 100% of the 1995 transfer cases identified
by CIS for which perfect juvenile matches were located; for Circuit 9, the number is 50% of the
CIS-identified cases with matches.
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These results were disappointing because most of the cases identified by
CIS as 1995 transfers for which a juvenile match could be located, in fact,
were not transferred. This low "hit" rate was primarily due to Circuit 6
where less than thirty percent of the CIS-identified cases were accurately
coded according to local court data. Most of the Circuit 6 errors occurred in
Pinellas County - the larger of the two counties in the circuit. Eighty
percent of the cases identified by CIS as 1995 transfers in the other Circuit
6 county (Pasco) were accurately identified. In all circuits, the largest rate
of error was due to cases that were identified by CIS as being transferred, but
which were not actually transferred.
At least part of this problem could be traced to CIS data entry. For
example, in Pinellas County, errors occurred because of the inconsistent use
of the abbreviation "trans." Coders counted cases with this abbreviation as
transfers. Sometimes the abbreviation did mean transfer to adult criminal
court, but in other cases the local court records showed that the offender had
merely been "transported" to another facility or "transferred" to another
county for juvenile processing. How abbreviations, acronyms, and various
information are coded in the state data bases may not accurately reflect what
they mean in local practice.
Several lessons were learned from the field research on clerk-of-court
records. First, state data are dependent on local input of information, the
accuracy of which can vary widely from locale to locale.59 More uniform
CIS data entry and better training in that data entry are needed to improve
the accuracy of the CIS data. Second, local variations occur at the county
level. The unit of analysis for sampling and matching ideally should be the
county rather than the larger judicial circuit. 6° Third, and most importantly,
at this point the state CIS data regarding transfer is too inaccurate to be used
by itself for either research or policy-making. The mere identification of
transfer itself is often wrong. Even in the locales where CIS is most accurate
in identifying transfer cases, the "hit" rate is 80%.
Although these data derive from a small number of Florida counties, we
have no reason to conclude that the problems we confronted are unique to
those counties or to Florida. Most efforts to collect information from local
sources and to code it in a useable way in a centralized repository probably
share some of these problems. The amount of inaccuracy found in the state
59. We suspect that the accuracy of the input can also vary from time to time in the same
jurisdiction.
60. An obvious problem with sampling from counties to pair transfer cases with juvenile
matches is that it reduces the chance of getting matched pairs from small jurisdictions. Small
numbers of cases in less populated jurisdictions make it more difficult to match precisely on
all the selection criteria. This matching problem makes it difficult to compare transfers with
matches in rural counties. Unfortunately, rural-urban differences in processing have been
documented. See Feld, supra note 42, at 156-57.
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data with regard to the designation of transfer cases in Florida raised
questions about whether CIS information on prior offenses, current charges,
and dispositions was similarly problematic. The validity and reliability
problems discovered in the sampling pointed to the prospect that the
seriousness of the transfer cases was masked in the automated state data.
D. In-Depth Profiling: How "Bad" Are the Transfers?
The clerk-of-court data allowed a more detailed look both at who was
being transferred to adult criminal court and how those transfers took place.
Although the local records data revealed that CIS had misidentified many
cases as transfers, those records confirmed the transfer in 243 cases. Of
these, 227 could be paired with matches from the juvenile system for which
local clerk of court data were also available. The local clerk-of-court records
were used to profile the 227 cases that were transferred to criminal court. By
concentrating on the 227 transfer cases for whom matches were located, indepth information could be used to address both how bad the transfers were
in the absolute and whether they were worse than their juvenile justice
matches.61
The detail in the local records allowed the course of a case to be
followed from arrest to final disposition. Documents marked every formal
procedural step. In a complete case file, nothing happened officially that was
not clearly documented. The result was a much more complete picture of
transfer than that obtained from the summary data contained in the state CIS
data. The in-depth data provided better insight into who the transfers really
were.
Table 3 presents the frequencies and percentages of transfer cases within
various offense categories. The figures in the first column indicate the
general offense breakdown of the cases according to the statewide CIS data.
The bulk of cases were charged with property felonies (43%). Nearly a third
were charged with violent personal felonies according to CIS (30%).
Smaller, but still substantial, percentages were charged with other felonies,
including drug felonies, or misdemeanors (17% and 10% respectively).
However, the overall pattern in CIS did not depict transfers as being
particularly serious or violent offenders.
The numbers and percentages in the second column of Table 3 present
information from local court records on the charges contained on the arrest

61. Twenty-eight of the 255 cases confirmed as 1995 transfers in the local record could
not be matched with a juvenile case. The following numbers and percentages include only
those 227 transfer cases for which juvenile matches were found. Even if the unmatched
transfer cases were included, the percentages might change but the basic conclusions would
not.
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or incident report or the sworn complaint that gave rise to the transfer
according to CIS. Because some episodes involved multiple incidents, for
example, burglarizing three separate cars at three different locations, more
than one report or complaint might have been reviewed. An incident was
defined as a discrete event or transaction that might involve one or more
counts.
Table 3
Primary Offense Categories for Transfers at
Various Stages of Case Processing

Category

CIS
Offense

Most Serious
Off. in Incident

Prosecution
Offense

Conviction
Offense

No.

%

No.

%

No.

%

No.

%

Personal
Felonies

69

30.4

71

31.3

55

24.3

36

19.1

Property
Felonies

97

42.7

101

44.5

107

47.3

91

48.4

Other
Felonies

38

16.7

37

16.3

38

16.8

33

17.6

Misdemeanors

23

10.1

18

7.9

26

11.5

28

14.9

Totals

227

227

226

188

No. = number; Off. = offense

The numbers and percentages in the second column reflect the most serious
charge found in the initiating reports or complaints for each transfer case.
Fourty-four percent of the cases were processed for property felonies. This
percentage is less than two points higher than that indicated in the CIS data
presented in the first column. In approximately 31% of the cases, the most
serious charge was a violent personal felony, a percentage that is about one
percentage point different from that indicated in the CIS data. The
percentage of other felonies as the most serious charge remained about the
same, 16% for most serious versus 17% for CIS data. Only the percentage
involving misdemeanors as the most serious charge decreased from 10% of
CIS charges to 8% of the most serious charges. For those cases that were
really transferred, CIS data captured seriousness of the offense quite well.
The profile of transfer cases that emerged from the initial incident reports
contained in the clerk files was not one dominated by violent offenders. A
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plurality of the transfer cases involved property felonies. Over a quarter of
transfers were accused of nonviolent and nonproperty felonies ("other
felonies") and misdemeanors.62
The numbers and percentages presented in the third column in Table 3
reiterate the concern that transfer was not reserved only for "bad" offenders.
We would expect particularly serious cases, especially those alleging personal
violence, to proceed through the system without major adjustments. While
all but one of the transfer cases were prosecuted,6 3 the percentage of cases
involving violent personal felonies dropped from 31% at initiation to 24% at
the prosecution stage. Less than a quarter of the transfer cases that were
prosecuted were prosecuted for violent personal felonies. The percentage of
transfers involving property felonies went up from 44% at initial charging to
47% at prosecution, and the percent involving misdemeanors increased from
8% to 12%. The percentage of those prosecuted for other felonies was much
the same as the percentage initially charged in this category, between 17 and
16%, respectively. Prosecution patterns in the four circuits did not indicate
that the transfer cases were particularly "bad."
The numbers and percentages of transfers in the four categories at
conviction, presented under the fourth column in Table 3, are also telling.
Following the original CIS charge through the court process, over 80% of the
transfer cases (n=188) resulted in convictions by the time the data were
collected, which was at least a year and a half after the incidents took
place. 64 The percentage of transfers in the violent personal felony category
went down from 24% charged to 19% convicted. The percentages of
transfers in the other three offense categories were slightly greater for
convictions than for prosecutions: the property felony percentage crept up
to 48% from 47%, the percentage for other felonies edged up to 18% from
17%, and that for misdemeanors increased to nearly 15% from 12%. The
transfer profile that emerged at conviction was not that of a violent predator.
If transfer cases were of an especially serious nature, we would not expect
the percentage decline in violent charges at conviction or the increase in

62. Some of the cases in the "other felony" category were not particularly serious crimes.
For example, the total number of drug felony charges was. low (n=26), and 14 of those were
for possession rather than possession with intent to sell, or sales, delivery, or manufacturing
of drugs. On the original charge, the local court data reinforced the concern raised by the CIS
offense categories: many of the transfers in these four circuits were not the worst of the
worst.
63. Initial charges at the time of arrest were subject to change before prosecution.
64. Because multiple incidents could give rise to charges that were consolidated (at the
time of the information, in plea bargaining, or at sentencing), the transfer case records might
contain convictions on charges other than the CIS charge that initiated the case. On a few
occasions, no conviction was obtained for the CIS charge but one was obtained on other
counts that had become part of the case. This occurred 12 times, so the total number of
transfer cases with a conviction on at least one count was 200 (88%).
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misdemeanor charges at conviction.
The picture of transfer cases obtained at conviction suggests fewer
serious offenders than the snapshot of offenders that was taken when charges
were initiated. The conviction profile, however, might reflect bargaining
processes that "cleansed" the records and made offenders look less serious
than they really were. Alternatively, the original charges might have been
exaggerated, perhaps due to incomplete information or overcharging to
provide leverage for bargaining.
Our impression as field researchers was that overcharging often took
place. Several examples help make this point. One first-time offender was
charged with a felony punishable by life (battery in the commission of a
burglary) for reaching into a car to choke another student driver who the
offender thought had cut him off. The victim suffered no serious injury, and
the conviction (on the original charge) brought relatively minor juvenile
sanctions even though the offender had reached 18 years of age by the time
the sentence was imposed." In another case, a young offender was charged
with armed burglary for breaking into an electrician's van (the burglary) that
contained a screwdriver (the weapon).
The most frequent sentence given to transfers upon conviction as reported
in the clerk records, was state-supervised release (n=73). Another ten
convicted juveniles received county-supervised release. The county clerk
records indicated that 42 transfers received prison or a split sentence
involving some time in prison, 24 received jail or a split sentence at the
county level, and 22 transfers were listed as being sentenced to juvenile
justice sanctions rather than criminal sanctions as adults. The records showed
that the remaining cases received fines or other sanctions. These sentencing
decisions suggested, as do the conviction charges, that many transfers were
not especially serious offenders - at least they did not receive especially
severe sentences.
A variety of other information collected from the local county clerk
records helped address the question of who was being transferred and shed
light on whether the transfers were serious or chronic offenders. They
included a number of indicators thought to be associated with the seriousness
of the crime: (1) weapon use, (2) victim injury, (3) property damage or loss,
(4) gang activity, (5) multiple counts or incidents, and (6) prior record. A
seventh factor, evidence of extralegal problems, for example, dropping out
of school, learning disabilities, mental problems, and being the victim of
abuse, might either reinforce or mitigate the seriousness of a case.

65. Florida law permits criminal court judges to revert to juvenile sanctions after
transferred youth have been adjudicated in adult court. See Bishop et al., supra note 18, at
17-18.
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Most of the transfers did not result because of weapon use. For nearly
two-thirds (65%) of the transfer cases, the records had no indication of a
weapon being involved in the incident(s). When a weapon was indicated in
the records, it was not necessarily a gun or firearm (18% of cases involved
a gun and 17% some other kind of weapon). Victim injury also did little to
explain why most cases were transferred. In nearly four-fifths (79%) of the
transfer cases, there was no indication of victim injury. This is not surprising
given the large number of cases premised on property or other nonpersonal
felonies. Of the 47 cases involving indications of injury, 22 victims received
some kind of medical treatment, and 12 complained of injury but had no
visible signs of any injury.
Most of the transfer cases did not involve large property losses or
extensive damage. Records for a majority of the 227 cases (n=128, 56%)
indicated some kind of property loss or damage. The bulk of these (n=70)
indicated property loss only. In the 72 transfer cases where the amount of
damage or loss was recorded, the recorded amount was less than $400 in 37
cases, but was more than $1000 in 20 cases.
For all the recent comment and concern about youth gangs, the records
of the transfer cases showed very little evidence of gang-related crime. Only
10 of the 227 transfer cases had an indication of gang activity in their case
records. Although an indication of gang involvement was rare, a majority of
transfers had codefendants. The presence of codefendants, especially adult
codefendants, 66 might indicate more serious and seasoned juvenile offenders.
For nearly 60% of the cases (n=133), at least one codefendant was indicated
in the court files. For the 98 cases where the age of the codefendant was
recorded, the codefendants were less than 18 years of age in 61 cases. The
data show that transfer cases generally were not complicated by either gang
activity or adult codefendants.
Transfers might have been involved in multicount incidents or multiple
incidents that gave rise to numerous counts rather than single events that led
to a single count. The way CIS organizes records around each referral might
inadvertently mask the seriousness of the offender's total crime involvement.
Court-record data were used to examine counts, charges, and incidents. The
case file records indicate whether the primary offense charge grew out of a
single incident or whether multiple incidents were known to prosecutors that
could be consolidated at different stages of the process. Multiple incidents
were not always formally combined for prosecution; they might be combined
at various stages. Sometimes charges from one incident would remain in the

66. See

MALCOM W. KLEIN, THE AMERICAN STREET GANG: ITS NATURE, PREVALENCE,

AND CONTROL 104-05 (1995); C. Ronald Huff, Comparing the Criminal Behavior of Youth
Gangs and At-Risk Youths, NAT'L INST. OF JUST. RES. IN BRIEF, OCt. 1998, at 1 (1998).

1999]

JUVENILE TRANSFER IN FLORIDA

juvenile court while those from another incident would be brought to adult
criminal court. However, the sanctions for all charges would be consolidated.
Over 72% of the transfer cases we observed stemmed from a single
incident according to the clerk-of-court data. The incidents usually involved
only one (47% of the cases) or two (35% of the cases) arrest charges - and
so were not unusually serious in this regard. Forty-five cases (20%) involved
multiple incidents that were known to the officers at the time of the arrest.
In 18 transfer cases (8%), prosecutors learned, after the original arrest, of
additional incidents that had also taken place. Because additional information, such as, discovering more incidents, was sometimes learned prior to
formal prosecution, the number of charges increased at the prosecution phase.
The average number of charges increased to over three counts at prosecution.
About a fifth (21%) of the transfer cases had additional counts from
separate incidents consolidated on the information. For 63 transfer cases
(28%), the records contained an indication of events that occurred after the
initial arrest and were relevant to prosecution, such as failure to appear, new
arrest, and escape. For 38 of these 63 cases, the intervening event was
indicated as an arrest for a new incident. Charges stemming from these
intervening events were consolidated with the original case only part of the
time.
Information collected from the clerk-of-court files indicated that the
median number of prior referrals was five. The court files, however, did not
systematically collect prior record information, and there was no indication
of priors for 68 transfer cases in the court files. When prior record was
included in the files, it often took the form of a computer printout of the CIS
referral history. Consequently, the local records did not supplement the CIS
data on this factor.
The field research in the local records also showed that the CIS referral
histories were used to make processing decisions. Sometimes the referral
histories were included so that the pretrial detention decision could be made.
Occasionally, the referral histories were included to help compute sentencing
guideline scores. 67 Other times, the referral histories would be part of
disposition and sentencing investigations or other evaluations submitted to the
court. Because the CIS data were organized around each referral, CIS had
no standard for grouping referrals into cases. 6 8 We discerned no uniform
way in which practitioners within or across the four circuits counted these

67. Sentences in Florida's criminal justice system are calculated on a point system
according to sentencing guidelines. See FLA. STAT. § 921.0014 (1998). Points are added for
prior record. See id.
68. For our research, the decision was made to group referrals occurring on the same day
into a case.
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prior referrals, even though the number of prior referrals was the basis for
various decisions during processing. Sometimes they counted each separate
referral, regardless of how many were opened on the same day, as a prior;
however, sometimes they only counted each disposition, which might
combine multiple referrals or even referrals from different times, as a single
prior case. The irony was multitiered. The CIS data, the reliability and
validity of which were questionable, were used in inconsistent ways to make
decisions throughout processing that, in turn, helped to produce outcomes
summarized in state data that might mask how serious the cases really were.
The CIS referrals were the basic unit by which everyone was computing prior
record.
The transfer cases had a mean of nearly eleven previous referral charges
listed in the CIS data. The charges were, on average, grouped across a little
less than seven prior cases (a case included all referrals opened on the same
day). Those cases usually did not involve a violent offense as the most
serious charge. The mean number of prior cases involving violence was less
than one for the transfers. Even from the local court files, the best, albeit
potentially flawed, measure of prior record was obtained from CIS. The CIS
data indicated that the transfer cases had multiple prior offenses but not
unusually serious or severe prior charges.
The records also indicated whether the transfers suffered from a variety
of other extralegal problems, including dropping out of school, functioning
below grade level, learning disabilities, mental or emotional problems,
physical disabilities, illicit drug use or addiction, alcohol abuse or addiction,
and physical or sexual abuse. While these indicators did not relate directly
to the offenses, they might have influenced decision-making by legal
officials. They also provided additional detail about who the transfers were.
The records of over 60% of the transfer cases included no indications of
these larger problems. In the 86 cases where there were such indications
(37.9%), usually only one or two problems were noted (n=57).
The presence of extralegal problems could have worked for or against the
transfers when officials dealt with their cases. Some kinds of problems
probably mitigated the seriousness of the crime or the attribution of
responsibility; other kinds of problems probably tended to aggravate its
seriousness.
Indicators of mitigating personal circumstances included
learning disabilities, physical disabilities, diagnosed mental or emotional
problems, and a history of suffering either physical or sexual abuse.
Indicators of aggravating extralegal problems included dropping out of
school, functioning below grade level, and using or abusing alcohol or drugs.
Only 16% (n=36) of the transfers had indications of mitigating extralegal
problems, whereas 30% (n=67) had aggravating ones. Forty-nine of the
transfers had more aggravating indicators than mitigating ones, and eighteen
had, on balance, more mitigating than aggravating extralegal problems. The
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local-records data did not yield any pattern of additional problems among
transfers that could be used to characterize the transfers as being unusually
"bad."
Our use of local court records to profile who the transfers were also
provided clues about the transfer process itself. Our findings regarding
transfers can be summarized by reviewing the patterns of processing that
emerged in the four circuits that were studied. First, transfer cases continued
to be screened from charging through disposition, with fewer cases remaining
in the most serious offense categories at each successive step. By the time
we collected our data - as least a year and a half after the crimes had
occurred - fewer than half of those with initial charges involving violent
personal offenses actually had been convicted on those charges. On the other
hand, more transfer cases were convicted on a primary misdemeanor offense
than had had initial primary charges of misdemeanors. This diminution of
offense seriousness continued into sentencing.
Second, clerk-of-court records on incidents and counts showed that most
transfer cases were not being driven by multiple incidents, lengthy lists of
charges, or consolidation of charges. Most were not affected by events that
occurred subsequent to arrest, like arrests for new crimes or failure to appear.
Most transfers involved a single incident and no more than two arrest
charges. In only 21% of the cases were additional charges from separate
incidents consolidated with the original case.
Third, nearly all the initial charges were translated into formal charges
for prosecution (226 of 227 cases).69 However, only 83% (n=188) of the
transfer cases had reached a conviction on the originating incident, as
indicated by CIS. Another 5% (n=12) had a conviction for a consolidated
charge. Thus, 88% of the transfer cases were convicted in some way.
Overall, nearly 30% (n=66) of the transfer cases had at least one count
dropped, and 12% (n=27) had at least one count reduced. It appears that the
gradual diminution in seriousness across processing is partly a function of
plea bargaining for these transfer cases.
Fourth, sentencing was not particularly harsh for the transfers who were
convicted. About one in ten of all transfers (and one in nine of all convicted
transfers) was sentenced back from criminal court to the juvenile court for
sanctions. The plurality of convicted transfers (n=83) received only some
form of supervised release (43%), and only a third (n=66) received an adult
sentence that included incarceration, with twenty-four being sent to jail rather
than prison.

69. That so many referral charges survived could reflect our methodology, in that we
studied only cases for which local records data were available. Recall that for some cases
designated as transfers by CIS, we found no local records in the adult system.
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These shifts toward the less serious charges would not be expected if
transfer were reserved for the worst cases. Neither the information on the
individuals who entered the adult system through transfer nor the information
on the case processing that took place once a transfer was in the adult system
indicates that transfers were particularly serious offenders. In fact, the range
of cases that were transferred and of criminal justice processing decisions that
were made once transfer occurred suggests that transfer in these Florida
circuits often dealt with cases that were not extraordinary. Another way to
examine this possibility is to compare transfers with their juvenile justice
matches, and this was done both in the aggregate and in head-to-head paired
comparisons in our study.
E. An Aggregate Comparison of Transfers and Matches:
Were Transfers the Worst of the Worst?
The aggregate analysis focused on 554 cases, which included the 227
cases correctly identified by CIS as transfers and their respective 227
juvenile-justice-system matches with which they were paired. The cases were
paired using seven variables derived from the state CIS data: offense,
number of referrals at time of the offense, number of prior referrals, number
of prior dispositions, age, race, and gender. According to the CIS data, the
groups were comparable, so by inference transfer was not reserved for the
worst of the worst. The local-records data served to check the equivalency
of the group of transfers and the group of juvenile justice matches.
The local-records analysis had two purposes. One was to assess the
relative seriousness of the transfer cases in comparison with juvenile justice
matches to learn more about who was being transferred. The other purpose
was to investigate the feasibility of a matching procedure based on the
automated state data for comparing transfer cases with juvenile justice cases.
Of particular interest was whether the CIS-based matching procedure
employed in our earlier research had yielded sufficiently equivalent
comparison groups to support our evaluation of the effects of transfer versus
retention in the juvenile justice system on recidivism.
Table 4 contrasts the offense categories at various stages of processing
for transfers and their juvenile justice matches. The figures under the first
column are the raw counts and percentages of the 227 CIS-identified transfers
and their juvenile justice matches on the CIS referral charge. The numbers
under the second column compare transfers and nontransfers on the most
serious charge listed in arrest and incident reports or complaints associated
with the event that gave rise to the CIS referral charge. The information
under the third column contrasts the two groups on the primary CIS charge
as it was presented for prosecution, and the numbers under the final column
contrast the transfers and juvenile matches on their most serious conviction
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offense. The total number of cases for each group at each stage are
presented at the bottom of the table.
Table 4
Primary Offense Categories for Transfers and
Matches at Various Stages of Case Processing
CIS

Most Serious

Prosecution

Conviction

Offense

Off. in Incident

Offense

Offense

Category

No.

%

No.

%

No.

%

No.

%

Personal
Felonies
Transfers
Matches

69
63

30.4
27.8

71
55

31.3
24.7

55
34

24.3
18.3

36
23

19.1
15.1

Property
Felonies
Transfers
Matches

97
91

42.7
40.1

101
97

44.5
43.5

107
81

47.3
43.5

91
62

48.4
40.8

Other
Felonies
Transfers
Matches

38
41

16.7
18.1

37
41

16.3
18.4

38
31

16.8
16.7

33
26

17.6
17.1

Misdemeanors
Transfers
Matches

23
32

10.1
14.1

18
30

7.9
13.5

26
40

11.5
21.5

28
41

14.9
27.0

Totals
Transfers
Matches

227
227

227
223

226
186

188
152

No. = number

The totals for each group are telling. The juvenile justice matches were
less likely to proceed to each successive stage of processing than were the
transfers. Whereas only one transfer case did not have the CIS charge
brought forward for prosecution in the court records, 41 match cases were
diverted prior to formal charging by the prosecutor.70 Thirty-nine of the

70. This might reflect our sampling strategy rather than important decision-making
differences in the justice systems. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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227 transfer cases did not proceed to conviction on the initial charge,
compared to 75 of the 227 juvenile matches.
Cases where the primary CIS charges began as violent personal felonies
were most likely to be altered prior to conviction for both the transfers to
criminal court and the juvenile justice matches, as seen in Table 4. These
alterations were the result of charges being either dropped or reduced to
lesser offenses. The number of cases involving property felonies was fairly
constant throughout the process for transfers, but dropped from 91 to 62 for
the juvenile justice matches. The number of cases involving other felonies
declined slightly for criminal court transfers from 38 to 33 and more
markedly for juvenile justice matches from 41 to 26. The cases involving
misdemeanors as the primary charge increased for the transfers from 23 to
28 cases and for juvenile justice matches from 32 to 41 cases. The greatest
difference between transfers and juvenile justice matches in regard to charges
was found in the property felony category, where more transfers had their
original charge proceed to conviction than did juvenile justice matches.
Overall, more transfers (n=188) than juvenile justice matches (n=152)
were convicted on charges stemming from the CIS incident. Of those
convicted of their initial CIS charges, transfers (n=73) and juvenile justice
matches (n=72) more often received probation-like sentences than other
sanctions. The number and percentage of juvenile cases (n=42 or 28% of
those convicted) that received any residential commitment was less than the
number and percentage of transfers who received prison or jail sentences
(n=66 or 35%).
Transfer cases can also be contrasted with their matches retained in the
juvenile justice system for the same factors used previously to detail who was
transferred. These factors include (1) weapon use, (2) victim injury, (3)
property damage or loss, (4) gang activity or involvement with codefendants,
(5) multiple counts or incidents, (6) prior record, and (7) extralegal
problems.7' Because more of the juvenile justice match cases did not
proceed through processing to disposition, a larger number of their case files
were thinner. We could not determine whether their cases were less severe
or whether the details were not collected because of a decision to divert or
"nolle" the case.72

71. The age of a juvenile's first run-in with the law has been found to predict recidivism.
This information is not readily located in the local records unless the first offense is known
to the researcher. The only efficient way to identify the first offense is through the state CIS
data. The CIS data showed that the transfer cases were slightly younger at the time of their
first referral (13.8 years) than were the matches (14.2 years). Although this difference was
statistically significant (using a t-test for correlated samples), the relationship between age of
first referral and transfer status in this sample was very weak (r=--.08).
72. Some cases or kinds of cases require different levels of attention to detail for
processing. Different levels of scrutiny will be given to the details in the official record and
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Transfers were more likely to involve charges of weapon use than were
the juvenile justice matches (80 of the 227 transfers versus 43 of the 227
matches). This difference was largely due to the greater incidence of transfer
cases involving handguns (35 for the transfers versus 9 for the matches).
Transfers also used weapons other than guns, knives, or blunt objects (like
tire irons or clubs) more often than their juvenile justice matches (16 for the
transfers versus 4 for the matches). In this respect, the group of transfers
seem to be more serious offenders than the match group. However, most
offenders in both groups did not use weapons. In other words, the "worst"
weapons offenders were not exclusively in the transfer group, and most
transfers did not use weapons.
Transfer cases were somewhat more likely to involve victim injury.
Some level of physical injury was reported in 45 of the 227 transfer cases
compared with 32 of the juvenile justice matches. The biggest difference
between the transfers and matches occurred at the highest degree of injury.
Eighteen of the victims injured by transfers were reported to have been taken
for medical treatment, but only five of the victims of the matches needed this
kind of medical attention. For all other injury categories, there was little
difference. The most that can be said on this dimension is that some of the
transfer cases were more serious because they involved injuries requiring
medical treatment. However, since some juvenile justice cases also involved
victim injury, the "worst" injury cases were not solely in the transfer group.
Indications of property damage or loss occurred in more transfer cases
than in the matches (128 of the 227 transfers versus 105 of the 227 matches).
The difference was largely due to cases in which only property damage
occurred. Thirty transfer cases were recorded as involving only property
damage, compared with only 12 match cases. Certainly, the presence of
property damage or loss did not clearly distinguish the transfer group from
the matches. Enough juvenile justice cases involved property damage, loss,
or both that a matching strategy was feasible. Furthermore there was little
difference between transfers and matches on the extent of the damage or loss.
The dollar amount was indicated for 72 of the transfer cases and 76 of the
juvenile justice matches, and the amount of loss or damage did not vary
markedly. The "worst" property offenders were not confined to the transfer
group.
Both transfer cases (n= 10) and juvenile justice matches (n=7) rarely had
indications of gang activity. The transfer cases were a little more likely,
however, to involve codefendants (133 of the transfer cases had codefendants
compared to 103 of the juvenile justice matches). When the ages of

different emphasis will be placed on entering additional details into the record. Not even the
local records are always directly comparable.
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codefendants were recorded, transfer cases were somewhat more likely to
have codefendants who were under 18 years of age (61 transfer cases versus
48 matches) and more who were 18 or older (38 transfer cases versus 24
matches). The data show that the transfer group and the match group were
equally "bad" in terms of gang activity - which, in fact, was not a serious
problem with less than 10% being involved in gang-related activities.
Additionally, in terms of involvement with adult codefendants, many of the
matches were as "bad" as the "worst" transfers.
Transfer cases arose more often than match cases from multiple incidents
known to officials prior to the prosecutor filing formal charges (45 transfer
cases versus 26 match cases) and from multiple incidents, some of which
were discovered after formal charges had been filed by the prosecutor (18
transfer cases versus 7 matches). Juvenile match cases stemmed more often
from a single incident than did transfers (194 match cases versus 164
transfers). Overall, the transfer cases tended to be somewhat more complex
than their matches. However, many of the matches were similar to transfer
cases on this dimension.
Another difference between transfers and their juvenile justice matches
that showed greater complexity in transfer cases emerged during case
processing. More than twice as many transfer cases (n=63) experienced some
intervening complication after formal charging by the prosecutor than
matched cases (n=30). This difference was almost entirely due to more
transfers being arrested for new crimes that occurred after processing had
begun. An arrest for a new offense was indicated in 38 transfer cases
compared with only 10 juvenile justice matches. This is one way in which
some of the transfer cases were more serious than their juvenile matches, but
this differential affected relatively few cases and occurred after the decision
to transfer had been made.
The median number of arrest counts for transfers (two) was higher than
that for matches (one). The median number of counts on the prosecutor's
information (two) was the same for both groups. The median number of
counts at conviction was two for transfer cases and one for the match cases.
Although transfers had more arrest and conviction charges, that does not
mean they benefitted less from dropped or reduced charges. At least when
formal charge reductions or count dismissals were examined, the transfers
benefitted more. Nearly 30% (n=66) of transfer cases contained indications
of at least one count being dropped, as opposed to less than 20% (n=42) of
match cases. Twelve percent of the transfer cases (n=27) had at least one
count reduced, but only 7% (n=17) of the match cases did. Recall, however,
that more of the juvenile justice match cases did not proceed to adjudication.
Some of their counts seemed to have been more informally suspended. The
impression from the fieldwork is that juvenile charges could remain pending
for lengthy periods, especially if the juvenile was already under Department
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of Juvenile Justice supervision. Given the countervailing complexities, the
local court data were inconclusive about how much worse the transfer cases
were. Certainly, some of the juvenile justice match cases were just as "bad"
on this dimension.
The prior records of the transfers and matches were examined using both
CIS data and local court records. The local clerk-of-court files contained
some indications of prior record found in a variety of documents, for
example, risk assessments for juvenile detention, adult sentencing guideline
work sheets, and presentence investigation reports. Prior record information,
however, was not systematically recorded, so the lack of an indication did not
necessarily mean that a case had no priors. Indications of a prior record were
almost always premised on the CIS data, including any errors the CIS data
contained or problems of interpretation they presented (for example how to
group multiple referrals in a case). An equal number of court files contained
the prior record information for both groups (159 transfer cases and 160
match cases). The median number of prior referrals was five for transfers
and four for matches.73
Reexamination of prior record information revealed only small differences between the groups. Transfers had higher mean levels of prior cases
(mean of 6.7) than did matches (mean of 5.0), and the sum of the total
number of counts contained in those prior cases was clearly higher for
transfers (mean of 10.6) than for matches (mean of 7.5). Cases having prior
violence were relatively rare, and transfers and matches were similar on this
dimension (mean of 0.6 for transfers and mean of 0.5 for matches). Both
groups had substantial prior records, although the transfers tended to have
lengthier prior records. The records of neither group were riddled with
violence.
Eighty-six transfer cases had at least one kind of extralegal problem
indicated in their records, compared with 116 juvenile justice matches.
Transfer cases were somewhat less likely to have extralegal problems
whether aggravating, like dropping out of school, functioning below grade
level, and using or abusing alcohol or drugs, or mitigating, like learning
disabilities, mental or emotional problems, physical disabilities, and physical
or sexual abuse. For the transfers, 16% had mitigating circumstances (n=36)
and 30% had aggravating extralegal problems (n=67). Over a quarter of the
matches had some mitigating indication (n=61), and more than 35% had
aggravating indications (n=85).
As shown by the data in this research, the juvenile justice matches were

73. Our matching procedure truncated prior record into categories of no prior referrals,
one or two prior referrals, and three or more prior referrals. The local court data indicated
that this may have curtailed differences, especially for those who had very lengthy prior
records.
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more likely to have indications of mitigating circumstances and aggravating
extralegal problems. When the balance between mitigating and aggravating
personal problems was calculated, little changed. Sixty-six matches (29%),
compared with 49 transfers (22%), had more aggravating than mitigating
indicators. Twenty-two matches (10%) and 18 transfers (8%) had a balance
of more mitigating problems.
With regards to aggravating extralegal problems, transfer cases were not
shown to be worse than the juvenile justice match cases. That the matches
were more likely to involve both more mitigating and more aggravating
extralegal problems might reflect differences between information collection
in the juvenile and adult systems. Extralegal problems are germane to the
juvenile system because of its traditional orientation toward treatment. Their
especially one operating under sentencing
relevance to the adult system,
74
clear.
less
is
guidelines,
None of the variables that the researchers obtained from the local records
clearly distinguished "more serious" transfer cases from "less serious"
juvenile matches, at least in the aggregate comparisons. Clearly, the state
CIS data did not identify transfer cases accurately. However, they did locate
roughly comparable juvenile justice matches for those transfer cases that were
accurately recorded as transfers.
To this point in the analysis, the comparison of transfers and matches
was pursued in the aggregate. On many dimensions, the transfer cases as a
group seemed to be a little "worse" than the group of juvenile justice
matches, but the differences were not pronounced and occurred in a relatively
small percentage of cases. The aggregate analysis left open the possibility
that many small differences combined to create complex cases in which
transfers were distinguished from juvenile justice system matches.
IV.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE MATCHED PAIRS ACROSS VARIABLES

Having compared transfers to their counterparts who remained in the
juvenile system in the aggregate, it was necessary to sharpen the comparison
by evaluating the matched pairs on each of the respective variables. An
examination of differences across all the variables for the respective pairs

74. The effort to incorporate extralegal problems into the comparison of transfers with
other juvenile offenders warrants further discussion. Inasmuch as the local data established
that the transfer cases tended to have lengthier prior records and the CIS data indicated that
the transfers tended to start their criminal careers at a slightly younger age, we initially
expected to find more extralegal problems, especially aggravating factors, among the transfers.
We suspect that the transfers really are as likely as their juvenile counterparts to have
additional problems, but that these extralegal factors are more likely to become a matter of
record in juvenile processing because of the traditional juvenile concern with "saving the
child." The same factors hold less relevance to decisions in criminal processing.
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revealed how often one member of the pair was qualitatively different from
the other.
An index was created to capture the cumulative nature of differences
across twelve variables. Indications on each of those twelve variables about
what constituted a less serious case were used to construct the index. 75 The
following variables were used:
(1) Cases that had no indication of prior referrals were less serious than
cases that had priors indicated, even if there was just one prior referral.
(2) Cases that had only a single arrest charge were less serious than those
that had more than one arrest charge.
(3) Cases that arose out of a single incident were less serious than those
that involved multiple incidents.
(4) Cases in which no additional charges were consolidated with the
original case during prosecution were less serious than those in which
consolidation occurred.
(5) Cases that had no indication of intervening legal problems after arrest
on the primary charge, like new arrests, failure to appear in court, or
escapes from supervision, were less serious than cases that had such
indications.
(6) Cases that had no indication of gang involvement were less serious
than cases that did.
(7) Cases that had no codefendants or accomplices were less serious than
cases that did.
(8) Cases with no indication of property damage or loss were less serious
than cases that involved property damage or loss.
(9) Cases in which no one was hurt were less serious than cases in which
there was an injured victim.
(10) Cases having no indication of weapons were less serious than cases
where weapons were involved.
(11) Cases involving misdemeanors and lesser felonies were less serious
than cases involving violent personal felonies or property felonies.
(12) Cases in which the defendant had more mitigating than aggravating

75. The index probably discriminates less serious cases from serious ones better than it
distinguishes the "worst of the worst." The index's mean and median lie at three indicators
of that which is "less serious" (out of a possible 12), so most of the cases are "serious."
Unfortunately, establishing cutoff points between what is "serious" and what is "more serious"
in cases will be difficult to do. For example, we know that a case without any property
damage is "less serious" than one with property damage. But how much "more serious" is
a case that involves $800 worth of property damage than a case that has only $400 worth of
damage? And how many more problems of data reliability and validity will we have when
we try to distinguish the more serious cases that have various amounts or degrees of damage
recorded? The reason our index used less serious indications is that they pose fewer
methodological problems.
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extralegal problems were less serious than cases in which the defendant
had more aggravating extralegal problems.
The more indicators found for a case across the twelve variables, the less
serious it was. The more serious cases had few indicators. The median
score across all cases on the index was 3; the mean was 2.92. Because the
standard deviation was 1.15, a pair of cases was considered to be different
if their scores on the index varied by more than one integer (or about a
standard deviation). The scores also indicated how often the transfer case
was less serious than the match case or vice versa.
The results suggested that the transfers and their matches were not very
different when the respective pairs of cases were examined across all the
variables captured by the index. In over 78% of the pairs (n=178), the cases
were about the same, that is, the index scores were within a standard
deviation of each other. In 14% of the cases (n=32), the match case was less
severe, but in 7% (n=17), the transfer case was less severe.
The small differences observed on the individual variables did not
accumulate to make marked differences overall. The transfers and juveniles
in the matched pairs were more often similar than different. The analysis
provided no support for the position that transfer was reserved for the "worst
of the worst" in these four Florida circuits.
V.

IMPLICATIONS FOR

FAIRNESS

AND EFFECTIVENESS

The effort to compare each CIS-identified transfer case with its match is
significant for issues of fairness and effectiveness. The detail in local records
raised questions about how precise the CIS matching was on particular
criteria, but the detail, itself, produced similar overall profiles between
transfers and matches in the juvenile system. Evidently, differences on
individual variables tended to counterbalance each other over many variables.
These results suggest that cases of similar severity can be found in both
the juvenile and adult systems. The automated state data did not contain all
the detail on young offenders necessary to know exactly how "bad" the
transfer cases were, whether they were the "worst of the worst," or whether
a valid comparison group of offenders retained in the juvenile system could
be found to conduct evaluations of the effects of transfer on recidivism.
Nevertheless, the profiles built from the local records data of the CISidentified matches converged with the profiles of the transfers. Although
many of the transfers and their matches were "bad" youths, the transfers did
not stand out as being clearly worse in most of the paired comparisons. If
the state CIS data do mask the seriousness of offenders or their cases, the
"cleansing" occurred for both transfers and their matches.
The local records data suggest that the matching worked relatively well
so that comparative recidivism studies can be performed. In other words, the
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relative effectiveness of transfer can be evaluated. The local records data
yield case profiles that are similar for pairs originally matched by state CIS
data. The caveat lay with the fact that so many cases were misidentified by
CIS as transfers. The basic comparative strategy employed in our previous
recidivism research was sound, but the comparison groups were probably
confounded because cases had been coded inaccurately.
Other criminal justice applications make use of general profiles like those
that emerged from this study. For example, risk assessment instruments have
established the utility of profiles for prediction. Given the overlap between
the transfer cases and the juvenile justice cases in this study, the development
of a risk assessment instrument to study recidivism might be a better way to
match cases than precision matching that relies on "noisy" CIS data.
Another alternative to both precision-matching and risk assessment
profiles is to use "clinical judgment., 76 Experts can make qualitative
judgments about the cases.77 The three lead researchers in this study have
begun to explore this possibility. They have analyzed the seriousness of the
cases in 40 matched pairs to assess how similar or dissimilar they are. Their
intercoder reliability is 95%. Out of the 40 pairs, 17 are judged to be of
similar seriousness (43%), 13 have the transfer case judged to be more
serious (32%), 8 have the matched juvenile case judged to be more serious
(20%) and 2 pairs result in conflicting judgments (5%). A qualitative clinical
judgment may give a better global "read" of a case because it does not attend
to a small number of predetermined matching criteria or risk factors.
However, for prediction purposes, clinical judgments are generally less
accurate across cases than are statistical risk assessment instruments.78 The
qualitative judgments, therefore, might have limited utility in recidivism
studies.

VI.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The decision to transfer a case from juvenile to adult jurisdiction alters
both how the case will be processed and what dispositions will be available.
Transfer is a qualitatively different response from traditional juvenile justice
interventions; it replaces the benign "helping" orientation of the juvenile
justice system with offense-driven punishment. 79 Legislation to expand
transfer has been fashioned with the belief that transfer will achieve fairness

76. See Don M. Gottfredson, Predictionand Classificationin Criminal Justice Decision

Making, in PREDICTION AND CLASSIFICATION 1,1 (Don M. Gottfredson & Michael Tonry eds.,
1987).

77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See Feld, Legislative Changes, supra note 5, at 487-88.
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and enhance punishment thereby deterring subsequent crime more effectively. 80 The adult punishment model is argued to be fairer and more
effective than the juvenile treatment model. The principle of offense
calibrates punishment to the offense and the offender's delinquency history,
and the emphasis on punishment avoids problems associated with treatment.8' Treatment has to be individualized to the offender, which raises
questions of fairness. Moreover, the treatment model has been discredited
in the minds of many, which raises questions about effectiveness.
Academic research does not support claims that transfer is fairer or more
effective than retention in juvenile court. However, the research can be
criticized because it has relied primarily on summary data maintained in
statewide automated data systems. Because the data are suspect, the
nonsupportive findings can be countered. The basic premises of the counter
argument are that (1) the summary data do not provide an accurate picture
of how "bad" the transfer cases are, (2) local prosecutors have more complete
information about these cases, (3) that information will show that transfer is
reserved for more serious and chronic cases, which are different from those
retained in the juvenile system, and (4) because real differences exist between
transfers and those retained in the juvenile system, the recidivism analyses
have compared nonequivalent groups and therefore are invalid. Our analyses
of data collected directly from the local court files address each of these
premises.
First, the in-depth local records data indicated that many transfer cases
were not particularly serious. Inasmuch as the state CIS data contained only
information about the original referral charges, they actually might have
overstated the seriousness of transfer cases. The in-depth local data showed
that formal charges and conviction charges were actually less serious overall
than were the original referral reasons contained in CIS that were used to
characterize the cases.
Second, our in-depth local records research uncovered a somewhat
surprising twist on the problems and prospects of state data. Despite their
access to more detailed information, local decisionmakers, including
prosecutors, relied on the CIS data for decision-making. The best information about prior record, one of the salient factors for decision-making,
found in the local court records was produced by CIS. For example,
sentencing guideline score sheets would often be accompanied by CIS
printouts so the prior record could be computed. For prior offenses that
occurred outside the county, CIS was the best way to locate the record. Even

80. See Juvenile Crime Control Act of 1997, H.R. 3, 105th Cong. (1997); Violent and
Repeat Juvenile Offender Act of 1997, S. 10, 105th Cong. (1997).
81. See BARRY FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE
COURT (1999).
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for those offenses that occurred in county, CIS was a quicker way of
documenting the record. The same data that were suspect for research
purposes were expedient for processing decisions.
Third, the detailed information in the local court records did not reveal
clear and consistent differences between transfer cases and the juvenile
justice matches that were identified through CIS data. Even among the
subset of transfer cases that involved chronic and serious offenders, juvenile
justice matches could be found that were as chronic and as serious according
to the more detailed data obtained from local records. Fourth, the local
records revealed that the CIS designation of transfer was often inaccurate, so
often, in fact, that the comparison groups in our original recidivism analyses
might have been confounded.82 On the one hand, this means that our
recidivism results need to be interpreted with some caution. On the other
hand, however, the data from the local records showed that transfer cases
could be matched with similar cases that remained in the juvenile justice
system.
This local records research adds another chapter to the policy debate over
transfer. The recent reforms in the juvenile justice system took place before
most of the relevant questions could be researched or evaluated. The reforms
generated a first wave of research relevant to issues of fairness and
effectiveness. Some research examined how many juveniles were transferred,
the kinds of offenses for which they were transferred, and other legally
relevant offender and offense characteristics and raised doubts about whether
transfer was reserved for the "worst of the worst." Other studies in this first
wave of research raised doubts about the effects of transfer on recidivism.
This first wave of research relied primarily on statewide automated data bases
that were readily available. Once the research itself was drawn into the
policy debate, the adequacy of the research data became an issue. Concerns
were raised that the summary data oversimplified transfer cases and decisionmaking and that comparisons made between transfer and juvenile cases were
misleading because they were based on incomplete information.
Our in-depth local records research was designed to address these
concerns. The research collected more complete information from local court
records to improve the comparisons. The additional information has
uncovered new and important complexities in our efforts to evaluate the
fairness and effectiveness of transfer policies and practices. To be sure, the
local data point to some inaccuracies in the automated data. The analysis of
in-depth local records data, however, supports the general conclusions of the

82. Because Fagan's work did not use Florida data, his recidivism analyses are not subject
to this reservation. See Fagan, The ComparativeAdvantage, supra note 28, at 79 (using data
from New Jersey and New York).
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first wave of research regarding fairness: many transfers do not involve
particularly serious cases, and most of the cases that are transferred to adult
court can be matched with a comparable case retained in the juvenile justice
system. Transfer is not reserved for the "worst" offenders in the four Florida
circuits we studied. The policy debate awaits findings from similar local
records research in other jurisdictions, but the best evidence to date refutes
claims that transfer enhances fairness.
The increased accuracy and completeness of information found in the
clerk-of-court files will improve our matching procedures so that better
recidivism analyses can be performed in the future. We recommend that
other researchers consider the potential slippage between automated summary
data and local records information. Evaluations of the relative effectiveness
of transfer for reducing recidivism will depend on valid comparisons. Based
on the evidence presented here, those valid comparisons will require local
records detail.

